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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of a probabilistic risk-sharing network struc-
ture on the optimal portfolio composition. We show that, even assuming identi-
cal agents, we are able to diﬀerentiate their optimal risk-choice once we assume
the link-structure deﬁning their relationship probabilistic. In particular, the
ﬁnal agent's portfolio composition is function of his location in the network.
If we assume positive asset-correlation coeﬃcients, the relative location of a
player in the graph inﬂuences his risk-behavior as much as those of his direct
and undirect partners in a not-straightforward way. We analyze also two po-
tential centrality measures able to select the key-player in the risk-sharing
network. The ﬁndings may help to select the central agent in a risk-sharing
community and to forecast the risk-exposure of the players. Finally, this pa-
per may explain natural diﬀerences between identical rational agents'choices
emerging in a probabilistic network setup.
JEL classiﬁcation: D85, D81, O17.
Keywords: Informal insurance, Risk-sharing, Network.
1 Introduction
The literature on informal insurance schemes between agents is wide. Even if infor-
mal insurance networks exist in diﬀerent forms and environments, for many years
social scientists have tried to explain the existence and the sustainability of this
phenomenon. It is empirically proved that groups of individuals, under certain con-
ditions, spontaneously form social insurance schemes (see for instance Fafschamps
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1992). Moreover, we also observe that the agents do not risk-share their endown-
ments with all the individuals composing the main community1. Given these stylized
facts many authors have explained theoretically these ﬁndings. The main challenge
was to prove how mutual insurance relationships between peers could be stable
in time despite the intuitive risk-sharing norm enforcement problem and the not-
always perfect observability of individuals` endowments (monitoring problem). As
Bloch et al. (2004) shows, there can be precise strategical reasons explaining partial-
insurance schemes or the limited-size of the risk-sharing group given certain condi-
tions. Speciﬁcally, they suggest that if the links have double roles such as liquidity
and information channel, we can expect just speciﬁc network structures arising as
equilibrum of a strategical problem and guaranteeing the transfer-norm enforcement.
Moreover, as Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) notices, individual optimal choices re-
lated to the agent's link structure can lead to indirect negative externalities to the
rest of the risk-sharing group and diﬀerentiate the ﬁnal outcomes observed by the
players. As Stack (1975), De Weerdt and University. United Nations (2002), Dercon
and De Weerdt (2002), and Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) have empirically shown,
the structure of the risk-sharing groups, in terms of connections between peers, seems
far from being randomly formed. A common feature of all the studies about the risk-
sharing problem that use a network analysis approach is to consider the transfers be-
tween individuals passing through bilateral relationships (represented geometrically
by a link between two nodes) so that, indirectly, the action of an agent can also inﬂu-
ence the one of another subject not directly connected with him. This intuitive and
simple concepts have suggested the social scientists to investigate more the impact
of the link-structure between risk-sharing individuals. Particular interest has been
focused on the punishment schemes enforced by the nodes (through link rewiring
strategies) to prevent deviations from the risk-sharing norm. In this paper we are
not directly interested on studying the norm-enforcement problem but we focus the
attention on the impact of a probabilistic link-structure on the agents` risk behavior,
i.e. agents computing their optimal risk-exposure and connected in a risk-sharing
structure through links consider the existance of the peers` connection not certain.
The intuition comes from the fact that once the risk-sharing structure between peers
is assumed probabilistic, the agents could ﬁnd optimal to modify their risk-exposure
according to their location in the network. Facing a probabilistic link-structure,
the impact of this uncertainty can be diﬀerent between the agents whenever located
in distinct locations through the network. There are many reasons to assume a
probabilistic link-structure in a risk-sharing model using a network approach. The
1See for instance Townsend (1995), Udry (1995), Fafchamps and Lund (2003), Murgai et al.
(2002), Fafchamps and Gubert (2007).
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existence of an agreement between two agents is usually explained by social or geo-
graphic factors (family membership, friendship and geographical proximity between
many)2. However, these exogenous factors could change on time, being strongly de-
pendent on the exogenous agents`environment (the existance of a peer itself can be
considered not perfectly certain in many cases). Moreover, if we reasonably assume
that a link between two peers is a bilateral and strategical choice, changes on the ex-
ogenous scenarios could let the peers reconsider their previous link-structure. In the
interbank market for example we observe a ﬁnite number of institutions exchanging
liquidity through short-period lending-contracts. This is a particular form of risk-
sharing between institutions, foundamental for the diﬀusion of liquidity in the bank-
system. Each bank can bilaterally choose to open one or more liquidity channels as
much as the relative partner-institutions. The proﬁtability of these connections can
change with the arrival of a new information on the partners` risk or more generally
with a change on the ﬁnancial environment. Being enforced by oﬃcial contracts, the
deviation from the risk-sharing norm is rarely observed in this case. However, the
individual risk taken by the peers is not easily monitorable by the relative partners.
This fact can lead to a classic moral hazard problem, in terms of risk-exposure or
risk-strategies chosen by the institutions, not solvable by mechanisms of punishment
studied using a network analysis approach (the perfect monitoring is a necessary
condition to enforce a norm). On the other hand, the choice of a partner-institution
seems to be strategical, function of speciﬁc market conditions (see for instance An-
gelini et al. (1996), Angelini et al. (2009),Soramaki et al. (2007), Gabrieli (2011)).
Given these facts, each agent may not consider the present bilateral relationships as
ﬁxed but dynamic and function of diﬀerent exogenous factors. In our model we argue
that adding uncertainty at level of the link-structure can help to explain diﬀerence
on optimal risk-choices of identical agents belonging to a risk-sharing community
and choosing their optimal portfolio composition. Thus, the probabilistic feature of
the graph could help to underline the importance of an agent`s location analysis to
understand relative advantages/disadvantages due to a player`s position.
As we will extesively describe in the ﬁnal section, this paper can improve the
literature on risk-sharing schemes in diﬀerent ways. Firstly, the model gives the
opportunity and the methods to forecast diﬀerent agents risk-exposures looking to
their locations in the structure and involving two main parameters: The probability
to observe in the future the present and existing links, and the correlation of the
risks taken by each agent. Secondly, it can help to demonstrate how we can observe
diﬀerent risk-behaviors even assuming identical agents once we add uncertainty on
the network structure deﬁning the relationships between the peers. This feature
2See for instance Rosenzweig and Stark (1989).
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in particular can also reﬁne the literature on network analysis opened by Galeotti
and Goyal (2010) and Bramoullé et al. (2010) between many. Finally, this paper can
enrich the literature studying the impact of the network structure on the community`s
risk-sharing degree (see for instance Ambrus et al. (2010), Battiston et al. (2009),
and Stiglitz (2010)).
The paper is organized as follows. In the ﬁrst Section we present the main
model where risk-sharing agents decide individually and optimally the composition
of their portfolio between two assets, a risk-free and a risky one, assuming zero
asset-correlation. In the second part of this section we study the impact on the
optimal portfolio choices of a positive asset-correlation. We present in particular two
examples of diﬀerent network structures with speciﬁc structural features, underlining
the importance of the relative nodes` location to explain the diﬀerent risk-behaviors.
In the last part of Section 2 we relax the perfect network observability assumption,
assuming myopic nodes. Finally we discuss and test some node centrality measures
and the implication of the model in terms of the minimizing-risk structure.
2 The model
In this section we introduce the model and the network notation. The model is
composed by two main parts. In the ﬁrst one we study the ﬁnal equilibria assuming
zero-correlation between the risky-assets, while in the second part we relax this
assumption and produce two cases of study.
2.1 The network setup
We consider N agents linked each other according the adjacency matrix Gn×n = [gij]
, where gij = 1 whenever the nodes i and j are connected by an undirected link
while gij = 0 otherwise. We assume also that gii = 0. We deﬁne the degree of node
i, di =
∑
gij∀j ∈ N . For simplicity we will consider just connected components,
i.e. gij 6= 0 for at least one j ∈ N . Payoﬀs are described by Ui(x, δ,G) where
δ ∈ (0, 1) ≡ probability that if gij = 1 for some j at time t, gij = 0 at t + 1. The
link lij between the nodes i and j describes the liquidity ﬂow channel between these
two nodes. In particular without direct connection, two nodes can transfer liquidity
each other just through a diﬀerent path. We thus keep a generic deﬁnition for the
link lij since it has not a precise physical meaning. Clearly lij exists if and only
if gij = 1. Finally, we deﬁne a path as a non-empty graph P = (V, L) of the form
V = {x0, x1, ..., xN} and L = {x0x1, x1x2, ..., xN−1xN}, where with xi∈N we deﬁne
the node i and with xixj the link or edge between i and j. Now we present the
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deﬁnition of structural symmetry using the notion of automorphism to describe
two or more nodes symmetrically located in a graph. Formally an automorphism is
a one-to-one mapping, τ , from N to N of a graph G(N,L) such that < i , j > ∈ L if
and only if <τ(i) , τ(j) > ∈ L. We can deﬁne automorphism equivalence between i
and j , i ≡AE j, if there exists some mapping τ such that τ(i) = j , and the mapping
τ is an automorphism. Thus, if we ﬁnd such automorphism and we are interested
on studying the impact of the link-structure on the agents, we can analyze selected
nodes of the graph representing the equivalence classes.
2.2 The zero-correlation case
There are n nodes/players, deciding how much invest of their unit capital on risky
asset, xi , and on risk-free asset, (1− xi) at time t. In particular, the risk-free asset
has variance σRF = 0, while the risky asset, σR > 0. Investing at t on the risk-free
asset yelds exactly the amount invested on it at t+1, while the expected return from
the risky asset is positive and equal to pxih, where p is the probability of positive
return h. The identical agents are risk-averse and maximize their expected proﬁt
choosing the optimal portfolio structure. At this stage the assets are identical for all
the players but independent each other. The nodes are connected through a network
structure describing the liquidity ﬂow-path between the peers. We assume in fact
that the agents transfer at each time t liquidity to each other following an equal-
sharing rule. Roughly speaking, at each t the agents agree to exchange liquidity
such that the ﬁnal income post-transfer is the same for all the agents belonging to
the component. We assume also that the network structure is common knowledge
and the players do not deviate from the sharing-rule. This means that the link lij
between two nodes i and j guarantees the respect of the risk-sharing norm, i.e., no
strategical deviation from the rule are allowed. As we will see formally, this setting
and overall the common knowledge of the whole network structure guarantees the
neutrality of the link-structure on the agents` optimal choices.
In absence of any connection (situation that we can deﬁne as the autarky case),
the expected income Y at time t for a generic agent i is
E[Yit] = xithp+ (1− xit)
for all i at time t . Consequently, the variance observed by player i will be
V ar[Yit] = σ
2
Rx
2
it
Moreover, we assume that the agents are homogeneous in risk-aversion. This
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assumption in particular gives us the possibility to exclude any other potential reason
to observe heterogeneous choices between the players. The agents` instantaneous
preferences are described by
uit(Cit) = E[Cit]− aV ar[Cit]
where a is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk-aversion and Cit is the consumption at
time t. Notice that if an agent i is not belonging to the risk-sharing group, Cit = Yit
. However, since we are considering just connected components (it does not exist
a node such that the degree is equal to zero in our setting), each agent takes into
account at each t the transfers to/from the rest of the players. Formally, the expected
income post-transfer is
Eit[Iit] = (xitph+ (1− xit))/n+ (ph
∑
j 6=i
xjt + (1− xjt))/n (2.1)
and since we assume identical agents and no uncertainty on the network structure
we expect xit = xjt for all i and j belonging to G. Thus, we can rewrite (2.1) as
Eit[Iit] = xitph+ (1− xit) (2.2)
or the expected income post-transfer is not changed. However, the variance ob-
served by each identical agent at time t is
V ar[Iit] = (x
2
itσ
2
R)/n
2 + (σ2R/n
2)
∑
j 6=i
x2j = (x
2
itσ
2
R)/n (2.3)
so as expected the variance is function of the component size n. Thus, given the
expressions above, maximizing the utility function we can ﬁnd the optimal capital
share x∗it invested on risky assets for all i ,
x∗it = n(ph− 1)/2aσ2R
The result is in line with the modern portfolio theory: The optimal capital-share
invested on risky-assets is function of the returns of these assets, of their variance,
of the risk-aversion coeﬃcient, and ﬁnally of the size of the risk-sharing group n.
To simplify the notation, from now on we deﬁne the rate (ph − 1)/2aσ2R with k.
As expected, given our assumptions, belonging to a risk-sharing group of identical
agents helps these to increase their capital share invested on risky-assets from k to
nk.
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As anticipated in the introduction, next step will be to add uncertainty on the
network structure assuming not certain the existence of each link at t+ 1 between
two generic nodes i and j such that gij = 1 at t. Formally, Prob[gij,t+1 = 1 | gij,t =
1] = (1− δ) ∈ (0, 1)∀i, j ∈ G. Notice that we do not allow the creation of new links
between the agents at this stage. As anticipated, this new model feature gives us the
opportunity to describe the case where each agent cannot completely rely on the links
he observes at time t. If this is the case, the location of each peer assumes a central
role for the optimal individual decision, i.e. we diﬀerentiate the nodes` ﬁnal optimal
choices. To give an example anticipating the formal results, let`s think about a star-
shaped network structure. A central node is connected with many (symmetrically
located) peripheral nodes so we can distinguish just two types of nodes. It is quite
clear in this case that once we assume a probabilistic structure the position of the
central node is more advantageous than that of the peripheral one. Firstly because
the central node observes more direct partners (he can obtain liquidity at t+ 1 with
higher probability) and also because of the link`s channel feature he has got, i.e.
a peripheral node can receive liquidity from another peripheral node if and only if
the liquidity ﬂow pass through the central node. As we will see formally, given the
probabilistic feature of the graph, the most central node(s) will expect to risk-share
with more agents than the peripheral ones. This advantage will diﬀerentiate the
players` ﬁnal choices.
Formally and for a generic network structure, the expected income post-transfer
of a generic node i now is
Eit[Iit] = (xitph+ (1− xit))/nit + (ph)/nit
∑
j 6=i
θij,txjt +
∑
j 6=i
θij,t(1− xjt)/nit (2.4)
where nit ≡ 1/Eit[ 1n ]3 and θij,t is the probability to observe the realization of the
partner j. At this stage, we assume zero-correlation between the risky assets, so the
variance observed by each node at time t is
V ar[Iit] = (x
2
itσ
2
R)/n
2
it + (σ
2
R/n
2
it)
∑
θij,tx
2
jt (2.5)
Maximizing the utility function we ﬁnd the optimal x∗i at time t
x∗it = nit(ph− 1)/2ασ2R (2.6)
We notice that the result is similar to the previous one except for the fact
3To compute nit we use the formula discussed in the 2.4 Section.
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that now the expected component size diﬀerentiates the optimal ﬁnal agent`s choice.
Intuitively a node i will observe the highest nit at time t than the rest of the nodes
j if and only if his average distance with the rest of the agents (number of links to
reach j) is the smallest one. In the example of the star-shaped network structure, the
central node of the star will observe the highest nit and consequently he will be able
to choose the highest xit between all the nodes belonging to the component. However,
anticipating the further analysis, we can say that once we assume agents` sight bigger
than one (a node i observes js distant more than one link from him), a simple
analysis of the nodes` degree is no more suﬃcient to deﬁne their centrality degree.
In fact, even if in a star-network the centrality of the nodes is intuitively related to
their degree, for a generic structure this is not always the case. In particular, at this
stage, we can use our measure nit to characterize the agents/nodes` centrality scores.
The nodes` centrality scores are proportional to nit ∀i ∈ G, i.e. the agents` centrality
is function of the expected number of partners with whom they will share their risk.
Finally, notice that the individual peers` choices do not aﬀect the single agent i`
decision at this stage. Without assuming diﬀerent from zero-correlation between the
risky-assets, the key feature diﬀerentiating the agents is just nit . In the next section
we will relax this assumption and discuss the relative implications.
2.3 The positive-correlation case
In this section we assume positive correlation between the risky-assets. The correla-
tion parameter is deﬁned by ϕ ∈ (0, 1) . We still mantain the previous assumptions
and in particular the one deﬁning the graph as probabilistic. Notice that the positive
asset-correlation does not inﬂuence the post-transfer expected income 2.4, but only
the variance observed by the agents at each t. Formally,
V ar[Iit] = (x
2
itσ
2
R)/n
2
it + (σ
2
R/n
2
it)
∑
j 6=i
θij,tx
2
jt + (2ϕσ
2
Rxit/n
2
it)
∑
j 6=i
θij,txjt (2.7)
Solving the optimization problem we can derive the best reply functions for each
node i ∈ G. In particular, we see that the optimal choice now is function also of the
partners` optimal ones,
x∗it = nit(ph− 1)/2ασ2R − ϕ
∑
θij,tx
∗
jt (2.8)
We notice that two main features aﬀect now the ﬁnal optimal choice of i. Firstly,
as we have seen in the previous section, the measures nit increases the optimal risk-
exposure of the agent (this is seen in the ﬁrst term of the expression above). Secondly,
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the increasing optimal x∗jt of the peers negatively aﬀects the agent i`s optimal risk-
exposure. Intuitively, higher is the risk taken by the peers, higher is the risk observed
by each node, given the positive asset-correlation. However, the j partners`optimal
choices are discounted by their distance with the node i: The i`s location aﬀects
again his optimal choice but in a reverse way. This is possible since the risk taken by
the i‘s peers, given ϕ ∈ (0, 1), is assumed partially substitute of the risk taken by
i himself. However, similarly to the discount coeﬃcient used by Bonacich (1987) in
his centrality measure, the choices of the i‘s partners are discounted by θij , function
of the distance from i to j nodes. Summarizing, the ﬁnal optimal choice is function
of nit , that depends on the relative location of i at time t in the network and on
link probability δ, of the correlation coeﬃcient ϕ, and ﬁnally of the peers` optimal
choices, function themselves of their relative locations.
To underline the importance of a structural analysis to forecast the optimal
agents` behaviors, we present below two examples considering diﬀerent starting net-
work structures. As anticipated we have chosen two speciﬁc graphs such that we can
easily observe the impact of diﬀerent locations on the ﬁnal nodes` choices. The ﬁrst
example considers three nodes connected through a line-shaped link-structure (see
Figure 2.1). The second one describes a seven-nodes network in which two symmet-
ric nodes have the highest degree and are respectively connected to two symmetric
pairs of peripheral nodes, and ﬁnally one node, located as a bridge between the two
automorphic subgraphs.
Figure 2.1: 3 nodes Star
In this ﬁrst example we start with a 3 nodes line-shaped network structure, where
the node labelled 2 connects 1 and 3. We can just study the nodes` choices of 1 and
2 since 3 belongs to the same equivalence class of 1. Assuming k = 0.2 and for the
moment ϕ = 0 we ﬁnd the following optimal x∗it (vertical axis) for δ between 0 and
1 (horizontal axis),
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Figure 2.2: 3 nodes Star with zero asset-correlation. We notice the advantage of the
node 2 over 1 and 3 for all the δ ∈ (0, 1).
As we can see, the node 2 mantains an advantage over 1 and 3 for all the
values of δ between 0 and 1. Before analyzing the second structure, we study the
eﬀect of diﬀerent positive values of ϕ on the optimal risky choice. To do this, we ﬁx
arbitrary values of δ, (0.3,0.5,0.7,0.8), and compute the optimal x∗it for diﬀerent ϕ
values (horizontal axis).
Figure 2.3: 3 nodes Star with positive asset-correlation and δ = 0.3. The node 2
chooses optimal x higher than 1 and 3 nodes for all ϕ ∈ (0, 1).
In the Fig.2.3 above the link probability is setted to δ = 0.3 and related expected
component-size vector n¯ = (2.19, 2.4, 2.19) . We observe that the node 2 still has an
advantage respect to 1 and 3. The probabilistic graph feature simply decreases the
optimal agents` choices without reverting the node 2`s advantage over 1 and 3. This
is possible since, given this speciﬁc structure, the node 2 has both an advantage in
terms of higher nit and relative location of his partners. As we will see in the next
pictures, increasing the probability δ, we observe smaller diﬀerences on the optimal
x∗it of the nodes, overall for high asset-correlation levels. In the next picture we
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present the optimal choices for δ = 0.5 ,
Figure 2.4: 3 nodes Star with positive asset-correlation and δ = 0.5.
As we can see the results do not change qualitatively from the previous one.
The node 2 mantains an higher advantage over 1 and 3 than in the previous case.
Following, we present other two for δ = 0.7 and 0.8 respectively.
Figure 2.5: 3 nodes Star with positive
asset-correlation and δ = 0.7.
Figure 2.6: 3 nodes Star with positive
asset-correlation and δ = 0.8. For ϕ >
0.7 we start to see the previous node
2`s advantage reverted in favour of the
peripheral nodes.
Summarizing, increasing the probability δ, given this star-shaped structure, we
observe a general decreasing of the nodes` optimal risk-exposure but also a decreasing
(in favour of the peripheral nodes after certain values of δ) of the relative diﬀerences
on x∗it between the players.
As anticipated above, now we propose the same analysis for a more complex
structure composed by seven nodes. As we can see from the Figure 2.7 below, the
nodes 1 and 3 are the ones with highest degree, {4,5,6,7} the ones with the low-
est (we will deﬁne them again as peripheral nodes), and ﬁnally the node 2 with a
relatively intermediate degree but a particular bridge position between two auto-
morphic subcomponents. This classiﬁcation describes as well the three equivalence
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classes composing the graph, thus we will analyze just the optimal choices of the
representative nodes 1, 2 and 4 of their respective equivalence classes.
Figure 2.7: 7 nodes structure
We start again analyzing the zero-correlation case. The optimal x∗it for δ between
0 and 1 are described below,
Figure 2.8: 7 nodes structure with zero asset-correlation. Until around ϕ = 0.1 the
node 2 has the highest optimal x. The peripheral nodes choose the lowest optimal x
for all ϕ ∈ (0, 1).
It is interesting to notice that until a particular level of δ, the most central node
is the node 2 (and consequently we expect 2 to choose the highest capital-share on
risky assets), but after that, the nodes 1 and 3 appears to have the highest nit scores.
This ﬁrst picture helps us to underline the impact of nit, function of the i`s location,
and of δ, on the ﬁnal optimal choice. As we have done previously, let`s assume now
positive asset-correlation for ﬁxed probability δ levels.
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Figure 2.9: 7 nodes structure with
positive asset-correlation. The node 1
chooses the highest x. The peripheral
nodes choose the lowest optimal x for
all ϕ ∈ (0, 1).
Figure 2.10: 7 nodes structure with
positive asset-correlation. We can no-
tice the decreasing diﬀerences between
the optimal x of the nodes 2 and 4,
once we increase the asset-correlation.
It is interesting to observe in the Figure 2.9 that the diﬀerences on the optimal
choices of the nodes 2 and the peripheral ones become smaller increasing the asset-
correlation. This is due to the smaller degree diﬀerence between them and also to
the negative eﬀect given by the relatively advantageous location of the nodes 1 and
3. The nodes 1 and 3 observe with higher probability the peripheral nodes (with
low nit scores) while the node 2 observes 1 and 3 as direct partners. This diﬀerence
explains in part their relative advantage. In the Figure 2.10 we can observe more
clearly the impact of the asset-correlation on the nodes` location. For δ ≥ 0.7 we
notice the advantage of the peripheral node 4 over 2 for ϕ > 0.5 . The intuition
behind is that when the structure is particularly uncertain and the asset-correlation
relatively high being more connected or at a shortest distance with other peers is not
more advantageous.
Following we present the optimal x∗it for δ = 0.7 and 0.8 respectively,
Figure 2.11: 7 nodes structure with
positive asset-correlation and δ = 0.7.
Figure 2.12: 7 nodes structure with
positive asset-correlation and δ = 0.8.
In the next section and before discussing about potential structural measures, we
discuss in more details the centrality measure nit. As anticipated in the introduc-
tion, nit relies on the probabilistic feature of the graph.
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2.4 The centrality measure nit
We have seen from (8) how the agents` ﬁnal optimal choices are dependent of their
relative location in the network. Moreover, the link between two peers aﬀects in
opposite ways the risk taken by them. As we have previously remarked, the positive
impact is described by the nit score, while the negative one is catched by the node`s
partners choices and the positive asset-correlation coeﬃcient. To compute nit we
calculate the expected number of peers with whom the agent i is expecting to share
his risk. This centrality measure in particular is function of the average distance
between the nodes: More links a node i needs to walk through to reach their partners
js, lower probability he faces to reach them, assuming δ i.i.d.. Formally,
nit =
1∑n
m=1 pm(Hm)
1
m
(2.9)
where m is the number of peers risk-sharing including i, δ is the probability
deﬁned between 0 and 1 that an existing link at t will exist at t + 1, and pm(Hm)
deﬁnes the probability to observe the subgraph Hm generated by a speciﬁc set of
ties (connecting the node i to other m − 1 nodes) containing m nodes including
i. Notice that we can have more than one combination of paths containing i and
m − 1 other nodes. The nit measure, diﬀerently from the Bonacich one, takes into
account all the paths including i and not only the ones emanated from this. The
density of the graph and consequently the average distance between the nodes
aﬀects directly the measure nit. A more dense graph in fact leads to higher number
of subgraphs Hm (increasing the number of combinations of m nodes including i
). However, nit is also function of the link-probability δ, so as we have seen from
the examples presented above, it is not always the case that for all the values of
δ ∈ (0, 1) the node with lower average distance from the rest of the agents has the
highest nit score. Summarizing, the nit centrality measure takes into account all
the possible paths passing through the node i at time t, it allows for ﬂowing by
parallel duplication, and ﬁnally it works on connected graphs (the distance between
two nodes belonging to two diﬀerent unconnected component is assumed inﬁnite).
In this model we assume also independent probability over the existance of each
distinct path. Finally we want to stress out the fact that this measure counts the
expected number of peers a node i is attached to at time t. This means that diﬀerently
from the mainstream of the network centrality measures, nit is node-founded even
if the paths to reach each peer directly inﬂuence the measure. We can observe a
clear example of this ambiguity in the second network structure presented above.
In that case, the node with highest closeness and betweeness scores is the node 2,
given his speciﬁc bridge location. However, measuring his centrality through nit
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we ﬁnd that just for particularly low link-probability δ the node 2 has the highest
score. Intuitively, even if the node can reach in less steps the rest of the peers,
with higher probability than 1 and 3 he can ﬁnd himself in isolation. Following
the Sabidussi (1966) criteria qualifying a centrality measure, we can notice that nit
fully satisfying them. In particular, adding a tie to a node i increases his nit score,
and adding a tie anywhere in the network never decreases his centrality. However,
as Borgatti and Everett (2006) underlines, these criteria do not fully explain the
centrality of a node. This feature can be also observed in our model: The total-
centrality of an agent is the result of two centrality measures as we can see from
the agent's best reply function. Thus, the nit measure in our model describes the
geodesic relative advantage/diadvantage of a node without giving us any information
about the relative advantage/disadvantage of the inﬂuence of a node. We have to
remark that the nit measure is directly connected to the Katz (1953) measure and
consequently to theBonacich (1987)'s one. Their measures are weighted counts of the
number of walks originating (or terminating) at a given node. This means roughly
speaking that long walks count less than short ones. However, the nit measure, as
previously said, counts the expected number of nodes reached by weighted paths (not
necessarely edge or vertex-independent).
We show below, as example, how we can compute the nit measure for the speciﬁc
case of a star-shaped network structure with one central star-node and n peripheral
nodes,
nit =
1∑n
c=1
1
c
(n−1)!
(c−1)![(n−1)−(c−1)]!(1− δ)c−1δn−c
njt =
1
δ +
∑n
c=2
1
c
(n−2)!
(c−1)![(n−2)−(c−1)]!(1− δ)c−1δn−c
with i labeling the star node and j the peripheral one.
2.5 Myopic nodes and positive asset-correlation
In this section we relax the perfect knowledge of the network structure assumption,
assuming that the agents can observe just their direct neighbors (nodes 1-link distant)
and neighbors 2-link distant. We mantain the rest of the previous assumptions as
much as the positive asset-correlation one. We start presenting the 7-nodes structure
previously studied, assuming 1-link nodes` sight and following, the case for 2-links
nodes` sight. Notice that for the particular1-link nodes` sight assumption, nit varies
between 1 and dit , the degree of node i. Assuming δ = 0.3 we obtain the following
results,
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Figure 2.13: 7 nodes structure, positive asset-correlation, myopic nodes (1 link sight)
and δ = 0.3.
We can clearly see the negative eﬀect of being connected to the nodes {1,3} faced
by the rest of the nodes, for low correlation values (ϕ < 0.7 ). However, we observe
the reverse situation for correlation values above 0.7: The nodes {2,4,5,6,7}choose
higher x∗ than 1 and 3, and in particular the node 2 has highest x∗. Notice that
assuming 1-link sight the nodes 1 and 3 observe highest number of partners for all
the values of δ between 0 and 1. However, the peer eﬀect is particularly clear for
the node 2 choosing lower x∗it than the peripheral nodes for some asset-correlation
level (the same is true for values ϕ > 0.7 comparing the nodes {1,3} with {4,5,6,7}).
For δ = 0.5 we obtain,
Figure 2.14: 7 nodes structure, positive asset-correlation, myopic nodes (1 link sight)
and δ = 0.5.
We notice immediately that for δ ≥ 0.5 we don`t have the particular result ob-
tained in the previous picture for ϕ > 0.7. However, even in this case we observe the
peer eﬀect reverting the relative advantage of the node 2 on {4,5,6,7} for ϕ > 0.9.
Following the Figures for δ = 0.7 and 0.8,
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Figure 2.15: 7 nodes structure, posi-
tive asset-correlation, myopic nodes (1
link sight) and δ = 0.7.
Figure 2.16: 7 nodes structure, posi-
tive asset-correlation, myopic nodes (1
link sight) and δ = 0.8.
At this high δ levels, we observe the reverting advantage noticed before for lower
asset-correlation coeﬃcients.
Now, as anticipated, we generate the results assuming 2-links distance sight. This
case appears to be more interesting than the previous one since the node 2 is the
only player able to see the whole structure, i.e. the strategical location of this agent
has a strong impact on the ﬁnal optimal agents`choices. For δ = 0.3 we obtain
Figure 2.17: 7 nodes structure, positive asset-correlation, myopic nodes (2 link sight)
and δ = 0.3.
At this probability level the node 2 observes highest nit than the rest of the nodes.
The node 2 mantains an advantage for all the ϕ values. Even in this case the peer
eﬀect is not strong enough to revert the impact of nit. Below the results for higher
δ,
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Figure 2.18: 7 nodes structure, posi-
tive asset-correlation, myopic nodes (2
link sight) and δ = 0.5.
Figure 2.19: 7 nodes structure, posi-
tive asset-correlation, myopic nodes (2
link sight) and δ = 0.7.
Figure 2.20: 7 nodes structure, positive asset-correlation, myopic nodes (2 link sight)
and δ = 0.8.
The results are qualitatively diﬀerent for δ > 0.3: The peer-eﬀect becomes central
to understand the choices` diﬀerences. In this case, the nodes 1 and 3 have a slightly
higher nit score than the node 2 but, for the fact that they are attached to relatively
disadvataged located nodes, the diﬀerence with node 2'optimal choice is ampliﬁed.
Notice that if we were studying the centrality a la Bonacich it would be not suﬃcient
to understand the results obtained above. This is due to two main features of the
model. Firstly, the fact that the results depend mainly on the two parameters δ
and ϕ. Secondly, the fact that the link in our model is channel of two diﬀerent
things. It represents both the liquidity channel between the agents and also a canal
through which the peers` risk is spread through the network. The models using
the β centrality measure or generally the eigenvectors centralities assume that the
peers`choices impact on an individual decision is either positive or negative. In this
model, both positive and negative eﬀects are present at the same time, as we can
see from the 2.6. Having higher nit means for a generic node i to face higher risk-
pooling opportunities, while higher Bonacich centrality scores of the direct partners
increase the risk observed by i for positive correlation coeﬃcients ϕ. We can also
argue that a simple analysis of the nodes`degree is not suﬃcient to understand the
optimal agents`choices. As we argue in the next section to pick up the most central
node(s) of the component, we need diﬀerent centrality measures.
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2.6 Structural analysis
In this section we try to underline the impact of the starting network structure on the
ﬁnal optimal agents` choices. Before starting the proper analysis it is necessary to
clarify the meaning of the link between the agents as much as the results obtained
so far. What we can understand from 2.6 is that the connection between two nodes
is both a channel of liquidity and a way to receive the peers` correlated risk. This
double feature represents the central key of the model. Analyzing the literature on
risk-sharing using a network analysis approach we see that the negative impact of the
peers was usually represented by their risk of default and its related consequences.
This implies that with this setting the link between two agents could exist if and
only if there has been a previous liquidity ﬂow between the interested parts. In this
model is not necessarely the case. The connection represents the existance of a risk-
sharing norm between two agents and no previous liquidity exchange is necessary to
observe a connection between two nodes. This diﬀerence becomes central to explain
the agents` behaviours observed in our model, overall if we recall the assumption of
no-deviation from the risk-sharing norm on the agents` strategies. In addition, the
double link`s feature prevents us to use only the Bonacich centrality measures to
understand the agent` choices. In fact, as underlined before, the Bonacich centrality
scores, a volume measure using the Borgatti 2006 terminology, could just explain
the negative\positive impact of the peer risk-choices but fails to take into account
at the same time the two opposite directions. Speciﬁcally, the Bonacich measures
can help us if and only if we assume one speciﬁc direction of the peers` impact on
the agent`s ﬁnal decision; In particular, the inﬂuence of a node's choice on the peers'
ones. Looking to the following picture we notice this feature,
Figure 2.21: Bonacich centrality for the 7 nodes structure.
According to the Bonacich centrality scores, for δ values between 0 and | 0.5 |
the nodes 1 and 3 are the most central. 4.What we can observe in the picture is the
4For the fact that δ is between 0 and 1 we know that the Bonacich centrality scores converges
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relative advantage given by the location of the nodes 1 and 3, but we miss the negative
eﬀect given by the same location once we assume in the model the ﬂow of a positive
correlated risk. We notice that the node 2 for example is particularly negatively
aﬀected by the close connections with the nodes 1 and 3, respectively linked to two
peripheral nodes (located in the worst geodesic position). However, as we can see
from the b.r.f. above, for particularly high correlation coeﬃcients, and uncertainty
on the ties' future existance, the peripheral nodes are those in advantageous location.
Given the dual-feature of the link we suggest two diﬀerent tools, focusing each
on one of the two link mentioned characteristics: The F¯ - and the Intercentrality-
measure. The ﬁrst one measures the fragmentation of the network due to the elim-
ination of a node i. In particular, the proposed F¯ -measure is a modiﬁed version of
the F -measure explained by Everett and Borgatti (2010) and takes into account the
expected size of the components created after the elimination of i from the main
connected component. This measure in particular can help us to understand the
impact of the elimination of a speciﬁc agent on the nit centrality measure. Formally,
F¯it = 1−
∑
j 6=i njt(njt − 1)
n2(n− 1)
bounded above at 1. This measure catches an important feature of network
structure. Intuitively, F¯ explains the impact of a node i on the risk-sharing group
in terms of his structural centrality. As example consider a star-shaped structure
with the node i as central agent connecting the rest of n− 1 js nodes through single
links with them. The elimination of the node i from the component fragments the
whole structure and creates n − 1 single-node components. In terms of F¯it score,
we will obtain F¯it = 1, its maximum level. Moreover, F¯it = 1 means that x
∗
jt = k,
their optimal x when they do not risk-share with other peers (autarky case). On the
other hand, suppose the case of a starting graph where the elimination of a node i
leaves a component of n− 1 nodes perfectly connected (the resulting component is
a connected network where all the j nodes can reach each other with a direct link).
In this case, the impact of i-elimination will be relatively the smallest (the exact
F¯it score depends also on the δ chosen) since the rest of the j nodes can still enjoy
the risk-pooling eﬀect in the most eﬀective way. The F¯ scores for the 3-nodes and
7-nodes structures presented above for δ ∈ (0, 1) are the following,
for δ 6= 0.5 since the inverse of the norm of the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix G is 0.5.
Moreover, we added the negative sign in front of δ since we want to analyze the centrality in the
case where the j peers` choices are substitute to xi and consequently have a negative impact on it.
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Figure 2.22: F¯ centrality for the 3
nodes Star.
Figure 2.23: F¯ centrality for the 7
nodes structure.
We can see that for the 3-nodes structure the node with the highest F¯ score is
the node 2 for all the δ ∈ (0, 1) and equal to 1: Taking out this node leads to the
maximal damage to the structure, leaving the nodes 1 and 3 isolated. For the 7-
nodes structure, again the node 2 has the highest F¯ score, but as we can see from the
picture above his F¯ centrality, for δ higher than 0.5, starts to be closer to the node 1
and 4`s ones. We will produce now the results for the F¯ scores of the myopic nodes
(observing just their direct neighbors or 1-link distant neighbors and 2-link distant
neighbors) composing the 7-nodes structure,
Figure 2.24: F¯ centrality for the 7
nodes structure with myopic nodes (1
link sight).
Figure 2.25: F¯ centrality for the 7
nodes structure with myopic nodes (2
links sight).
In the ﬁrst case we notice that the node 1 (and symmetrically the node 3) has
the highest F¯ score, i.e. the elimination of this node damages more the risk-sharing
structure. It is interesting to notice the higher impact of the peripheral node than the
node 2. Observe also that at this stage we have analyzed the impact of a single-node
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elimination and not multiple-nodes one. Assuming 2-links distant sight, the nodes 1
and 3 remain the most central according to the F¯ measure.
The second measure is a particular centrality tool developed by Ballester et al.
(2006) that helps us to understand the impact of a node i on the Bonacich centrality
scores of his peers. In particular this measure can tell us the negative impact of the
relative peer location. Formally,
cit(g, β) = b(g, β)− b(g−i, β) + 1
or alternatively,
cit(g, β) = bit(g, β) +
∑
j 6=i
[bjt(g, β)− bjt(g−i, β)]
with bit(g, δ) deﬁning the Bonacich score of the node i belonging to the component
g at time t. Computing the intercentrality scores for our 7-nodes structure, we ﬁnd
the following results for | δ |∈ (0, 1),
Figure 2.26: Intercentrality scores for the 7 nodes structure.
As we can see from the table, when we assume relatively small β coeﬃcients, the
higher impact is given by the elimination of the nodes 1 and 3. Once we assume
higher β, the central node is the agent 2.
Summarizing, the parallel analysis of these two measures could explain the impact
of each node i in terms of the i`s role in the network. High F¯i values tell us that the
cohesion of the network strongly depends on the node i, while ci(g, β) scores show
the i‘s peer eﬀect on the other nodes. The net impact on the ﬁnal agents` choices
will depend on the parameters δ and ϕ assumed.
[................]
Talking about the structure impact on the agents` choices we focus the attention
now on the average agent`s distance from the rest of the group. The average distance
measure dit for a node i at time t gives us the geographical information about an
agent`s location in the network. Formally,
dit =
∑
j 6=i dij
n− 1
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Again, smaller dit does not necessarely mean to choose higher x
∗
it, as we have seen
in the previous examples. However, we argue that, under certain conditions, there
exists just a unique structure minimizing the risk taken by the agents, and this is
the line structure.
We start proving that starting from a line-shaped network structure, any rewiring
leads to higher average distance between the nodes.
Claim 1. Any structure diﬀerent from the line-shaped one leads to
higher average distance between the nodes.
Proof. Assume a starting line-shaped network structure of n ≥ 4 nodes as in the
Figure (2.27). Let`s label the nodes as j1, j2, ..., jn , where with the node indexed with
1 we label one of the two peripheral nodes (the other one consequently is indexed
with n ). For simplicity (but without aﬀecting the ﬁnal conclusion) we modify the
structure, cutting the link between the ﬁrst node of the line, j1, with the second one,
j2 , and we activate a new link between j1 and a generic node jm , with m ∈ [3, n−1]
as in the Figure (2.28). In this way, the structure now is not more a line but a generic
tree with the same number of links between the nodes. Firstly, notice that for the
node 1, linking with another node diﬀerent from j2 can only be beneﬁcial in terms
of average distance with the rest of the nodes, i.e. the net-impact for this node will
be positive. The same we can say about the nodes jm+a with a ∈ [0, n−m]. In fact,
for all of them it is changed the distance (now shorter) from the node j1 without
aﬀecting the distance with the rest of the nodes. Thus, until now we can say that
j1 and jm+a will have a positive net-impact from the new link-rewiring. Now, let`s
divide the rest of the nodes, indexed as jh, with h ∈ [2,m − 1], in two sets: One
composed by nodes such that m − h ≤ h − 2 , or h ≥ m+2
2
, and one such that
h < m+2
2
. Notice that doing this we are dividing the jh nodes between those nodes
such that the distance between them and jm node is smaller/equal than the previous
distance (before the rewiring) with j1 ,with the ones where the converse is true. The
intuition behind that comes from the fact that for the nodes such that h ≥ m+2
2
, we
expect a positive net impact from the rewiring since they will be linked to the node
j1 in shorter distance, while for the other ones, the new structure will connect them
to j1 with a longer path than before the rewiring. Finally, we need to show that the
number of nodes belonging to the latter group is always lower than the number of
the rest of the nodes belonging to the network, for any line-shaped structure of n
nodes. In particular, it must be true that m+2
2
− 1 ≤ 1 + n− m+2
2
or m+ 2 ≤ n+ 2 .
This is always true with strict inequality, given our initial assumptions on m and n.
Thus, we can conclude that any structural modiﬁcation to the line-shaped network
leads to a graph where the average distance between the nodes is lower.
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Figure 2.27: Seven nodes Line. Figure 2.28: Seven nodes Line
rewired.
Given this result we can show that, under certain conditions, the line-shaped
network structure is the one minimizing the total risk taken by the agents belonging
to the component.
Claim 2. Given our assumptions and ϕ such that ∂xi
∂dit
< 0, the net-
work structure minimizing the total risk taken by the agents is unique and
it is the line-structure.
Let`s underline the fact that the total risk (variance) observed at each t, is function
of the capital shares invested by the agents on the risky-assets. We have previously
showed that the optimal x∗it chosen by a generic agent i is a function f(nit) and that
nit is a function g(δ) of the probability δ ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, nit depends on the
relative location of the node i at time t. In fact, as we can see from the formula used
to compute nit, shorter average distance dit implies higher probability (in average) to
observe the partner nodes and consequently higher nit score. In particular, let`s deﬁne
with lG =
1
n(n−1)
∑
dit the total average distance between the nodes of the component
G. As we have said, ∂ni
∂di
< 0 since more a node i is distant from the rest of the nodes
(more links between i and any j ∈ G) lower is the expected number of agents observed
at t + 1 (lower nit). Thus, by chain rule we have
∂x∗it
∂dit
= ∂f(.)
∂nit
∂g(.)
∂dit
− ϕ∑j 6=i ∂θij∂dit ∂x∗jt∂dit ,
with
∂θij
∂dit
< 0 for the same reason explained for nit, and not clear sign of
∂x∗jt
∂dit
since
it depends on the impact of the change of average distance of i, dit , on the average
distance djt, i.e.
∂x∗jt
∂dit
=
∂x∗jt
∂djt
∂djt
∂dit
. Thus, the net impact of an increasing of dit on the
optimal i`s choice depends also on ϕ and on
∂x∗jt
∂dit
. Underlined this fact and given the
previous claim on the structure maximizing the distance between the nodes, we can
say that, given a speciﬁc value of ϕ small enough or such that
∑
j 6=i
∂x∗jt
∂dit
< 0, the
network structure with highest average distance between the nodes is the line, and
this will be also the structure with lowest individual risk taken by the agents.
We generate an example that shows precisely what we have claimed. In the
pictures below we present two graphs composed by 4 nodes: A star-shaped and a
line-shaped one. As we can see from the b.r.f. below, given δ we are able to compute
the ϕ such that the line (higher average distance) guarantees to a speciﬁc node higher
capital shares on risky assets.
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Figure 2.29: 4 nodes Star. Figure 2.30: 4 nodes Line.
Notice that the previous claim is only valid for ϕ and δ such that ∂xit
∂dit
< 0. This
restriction is necessary since for ϕ and δ such that ∂xit
∂dit
> 0 the correlation coeﬃcient
is high enough to revert the positive eﬀect on the optimal xit of an higher nit score to
a negative one. Intuitively, for high enough asset-correlation levels, being connected
with more nodes (in expected value) and overall linked with nodes in advantageous
locations could become not-beneﬁcial for some agent (see the Figures below).
Figure 2.31: 3 node`s best reply for
ϕ ∈ (0, 1) belonging to the Star or
the Line (as peripheral node) for δ =
0.3.
Figure 2.32: 3 node`s best reply for
ϕ ∈ (0, 1) belonging to the Star or
the Line (as peripheral node) for δ =
0.5.
Figure 2.33: 3 node`s best reply for
ϕ ∈ (0, 1) belonging to the Star or
the Line (as peripheral node) for δ =
0.7.
Figure 2.34: 3 node`s best reply for
ϕ ∈ (0, 1) belonging to the Star or
the Line (as peripheral node) for δ =
0.8.
Without reporting the plots, we remark that for the nodes 1 and 2, we ﬁnd that
the star-shaped network is more beneﬁcial than the line for all the δ ∈ (0, 1). This
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is possible since intuitively these nodes beneﬁt from the star structure in terms of
both shorter average distance and peer eﬀect.
Notice that the model does not take into account the leverage between the agents
and the default of a peer is not allowed in this model. Even if we assume that the
link-structure is probabilistic, the consequence of an exit from the risk-sharing group
of a node does not aﬀect directly the income of the other peers. This is possible since
we are considering a two-periods game with no repayment-problem. For the same
reason, we do not study in this model contagion eﬀects or related problematics
usually underlined in the literature.
[ADD THE CASE FOR THE 3 NODES NET]
3 Conclusions
In this paper we show that, assuming a probabilistic network structure between risk-
sharing agents, deciding their optimal capital share to invest on risky assets, we are
able to diﬀerentiate the agents`optimal choices, without assuming any diﬀerence on
agents'degree of risk aversion. In particular, the ﬁnal optimal choices will be function
of their relative location through the network. We analyxe also two measures able
to characterize the most central agents in our model: One is a modiﬁed version of
the F measures proposed byEverett and Borgatti (2010), F¯ , and the other one, the
Intercentrality measure discussed in Ballester et al. (2006). In particular, we ﬁnd
that the F¯ measure can be useful to pick up the key-player , or the most inﬂuencial
node in terms of risk-sharing impact on the expected number of partners to risk-
share with. Conversely, the Intercentrality measure can help to forecast the most
central node(s) in terms of risk-inﬂuence on the other peers. The key feature of our
model is given by the double-role of the links between the agents. If a bilateral link
can guarantees liquidity ﬂow between the agents for some exogenous probability, it
is also a risk-channel for the peers once we assume positive asset-correlation coeﬃ-
cients. The results obtained underline the importance of a structural analysis to
understand and forecast potential risk-behaviors of agents belonging to a risk-sharing
group. Even if we do not consider norm-enforcement strategies in this paper, we are
able to explain the optimality of diﬀerent risk-exposures chosen by identical agents.
Assuming a probabilistic link-structure we want to describe a speciﬁc scenario where
the agents do not consider their present relationships as certain. There are many ex-
amples catching this feature. One of this could be the interbank market: The present
liquidity channels between institutions (in our model represented by links between
peers) seem to be dynamic on time and sensible to exogenous changes on the ﬁ-
nancial market scenarios. Even at community level, the link between individuals,
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representing the existance of a risk-sharing norm between peers, is often explained by
previous social-relationships between the partners. However, monitoring constraints
and exogenous changes on the social-connections can undermine the existance of the
liquidity channels between the parts, i.e. precautionary risk-behaviors could be the
optimal startegy in such environment.
The aim of this paper is to improve the risk-sharing literature using a network
analysis approach. The previous works studying the structure of the bilateral rela-
tionships between agents have focused the attention mainly on the dynamic of the
network and in particular on the potential norm-enforcement using links-rewiring
as deviation punishment strategy. This paper underlines more the importance of
the structure on the optimal risk-choice taken by the connected agents. Further
extesions could reﬁne the probabilistic setting, linking the link-probability to the
risk-exposures of the agents for example. Doing this way one of the central factors
that in this model was assumed exogenous could be endogenized through the players`
optimization problem. Moreover, adding the dynamic on the link structure can com-
plete the model opening new questions in terms of expected equilibrium structures
and thus explain the dynamic of the network structure observed in the interbank
market between many. Given the probabilistic feature of the risk-sharing network
and given speciﬁc asset-correlation coeﬃcients for example, it could be interesting to
study optimal link-rewiring strategies and related equilibrium structures.
References
Ambrus, A., Mobius, M., and Szeidl, A. (2010). Consumption risk-sharing in social
networks. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Angelini, P., Maresca, G., and Russo, D. (1996). Systemic risk in the netting system.
Journal of Banking & Finance, 20(5):853868.
Angelini, P., Nobili, A., and Picillo, M. (2009). The interbank market after August
2007: what has changed and why? Banca d'Italia.
Ballester, C., Calvó-Armengol, A., and Zenou, Y. (2006). Who's who in networks.
wanted: the key player. Econometrica, 74(5):14031417.
Battiston, S., Gatti, D., Gallegati, M., Greenwald, B., and Stiglitz, J. (2009). Liaisons
dangereuses: Increasing connectivity, risk sharing, and systemic risk. Technical
report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
27
Bloch, F., Genicot, G., and Ray, D. (2004). Social networks and informal insurance.
Technical report, mimeo graph.
Bonacich, P. (1987). Power and centrality: A family of measures. American journal
of sociology, pages 11701182.
Borgatti, S. and Everett, M. (2006). A graph-theoretic perspective on centrality.
Social networks, 28(4):466484.
Bramoullé, Y. and Kranton, R. (2007). Risk-sharing networks. Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization, 64(3-4):275294.
Bramoullé, Y., Kranton, R., and DkAmours, M. (2010). Strategic interaction and
networks.
De Weerdt, J. and University. United Nations, W. I. (2002). Risk-sharing and en-
dogenous network formation. WIDER DISCUSSION PAPER WDP.
Dercon, S. and De Weerdt, J. (2002). Risk-sharing networks and insurance against
illness. Centre for the Study of African Economies, Working Paper Series, 17.
Everett, M. and Borgatti, S. (2010). Induced, endogenous and exogenous centrality.
Social Networks, 32(4):339344.
Fafchamps, M. and Gubert, F. (2007). The formation of risk sharing networks.
Journal of Development Economics, 83(2):326350.
Fafchamps, M. and Lund, S. (2003). Risk-sharing networks in rural philippines.
Journal of development Economics, 71(2):261287.
Gabrieli, S. (2011). The microstructure of the money market before and after the
ﬁnancial crisis: a network perspective.
Galeotti, A. and Goyal, S. (2010). The law of the few. The American Economic
Review, 100(4):14681492.
Katz, L. (1953). A new status index derived from sociometric analysis. Psychome-
trika, 18(1):3943.
Murgai, R., Winters, P., Sadoulet, E., and Janvry, A. (2002). Localized and incom-
plete mutual insurance. Journal of Development Economics, 67(2):245274.
Rosenzweig, M. and Stark, O. (1989). Consumption smoothing, migration, and
marriage: Evidence from rural india. The Journal of Political Economy, pages
905926.
28
Sabidussi, G. (1966). The centrality index of a graph. Psychometrika, 31(4):581603.
Soramaki, K., Bech, M., Arnold, J., Glass, R., and Beyeler, W. (2007). The topology
of interbank payment ﬂows. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications,
379(1):317333.
Stack, C. (1975). All our kin: Strategies for survival in a black community. Basic
Books.
Stiglitz, J. (2010). Risk and global economic architecture: Why full ﬁnancial in-
tegration may be undesirable. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Townsend, R. (1995). Consumption insurance: An evaluation of risk-bearing systems
in low-income economies. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(3):83102.
Udry, C. (1995). Risk and saving in northern nigeria. The American Economic
Review, 85(5):12871300.
29
